Vernon Ray Rigby v. Loralie Kemp Rigby : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Vernon Ray Rigby v. Loralie Kemp Rigby : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jay L. Kessler; Attorney for Appellee.
David J. Friel; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Rigby v. Rigby, No. 20050616 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5903
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VERNON RAY RIGBY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20050616 
APPELLEE BRIEF 
Appeal from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce entered June 13, 2005, by the Third District Trial Court 
Judge Robert W. Adkins (All parties contained in caption) 
Jay L. Kessler, (8550) 
Attorney for Appellee 
Kessler Law Office, L.L.C. 
9117 West 2700 South, #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
David J. Friel, (6225) 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive 
Suite 225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801)975-1122 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
• A P R ' 1 0 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VERNON RAY RIGBY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20050616 
APPELLEE BRIEF 
Appeal from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce entered June 13, 2005, by the Third District Trial Court 
Judge Robert W. Adkins (All parties contained in caption) 
Jay L. Kessler, (8550) 
Attorney for Appellee 
Kessler Law Office, L.L.C. 
9117 West 2700 South, #A 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
David J. Friel, (6225) 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive 
Suite 225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 975-1122 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 6-12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 12 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 12-14 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..14 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and the Decree of Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income, 
expenses, needs, and equitable concerns, such as the length of the 
marriage and contemptuous actions by the Petitioner, to make an 
award of alimony which equalizes the parties' income 14-19 
POINT II 
The trial court properly divided the equity in the parties' home by 
taking into consideration the award of attorney's fees granted to the 
Respondent, and the serious contempt issues adjudicated against 
the Petitioner; and the trial court did not abuse his discretion with 
respect to finding the Petitioner in contempt in several areas.... 19-22 
POINT III 
The Appellant did not properly marshal the evidence in this matter, 
and as such, the appeal should be denied 22-23 
CONCLUSION 24 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 25 
ADDENDUM 26 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
U.C.A. §30-3-5 6-12 
U.R.A.P. Rule 3 4 
Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1986) 4, 23 
Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987) 5 
State of Utah v. PenaT 869 P.2d 932 (1994) 5 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991) 5 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Ut. Ct App. 1991) 5, 23 
Munns v. Munns. P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 15 
Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 17, 18 
In re CannetellaT 2006 P.3d 89, (UT Ct. App. March, 2006) 19 
3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VERNON RAY RIGBY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20050616 
APPELLEE BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Are the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income, expenses, needs, and 
equitable concerns, such as the length of the marriage and contemptuous 
actions by the Petitioner, to make an award of alimony which equalizes the 
parties' income? 
2. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in holding the Petitioner in 
contempt, and in dividing the equity in the marital property 15% to 
petitioner and 85% to the Respondent? 
3. Has the Petitioner/Appellant properly marshaled the evidence 
pursuant to Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989)? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "Trial courts are given 
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact 
are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard. 
For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the 
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's determination." State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(1994). 
The appellate court's standard of review with regard to issues of law 
are, "that all applications of law to findings of fact that produce conclusions 
of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness." 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991). 
In reviewing marshaled evidence, the appellate court standard of 
review requires the appellate court to defer to the trial court's judgment and 
not to disturb it so long as the court finds that the trial court has exercised 
its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate 
courts. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Ut. Ct App. 1991). 
If the appellate court does not have marshaled evidence, "there is no 
reason to disturb the trial court's findings." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 
150 (Utah 1987). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§30-3-5- of the Utah Code Annotated 
Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children - Division of debts - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time - Determination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree Of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint 
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and 
regarding the parties* separate, current addresses; and 
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(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 
11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that 
the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would 
be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial 
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children 
born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be 
added to the decree by modification. 
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(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall 
consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time 
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any 
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule 
entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of 
a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that 
action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, 
or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate 
family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party 
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time. 
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(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse 
or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
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duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has 
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and 
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court 
may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regafding alimony based on a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
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(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the 
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court 
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of 
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment 
of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically 
terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if 
the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of 
alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
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action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Court of Appeals should dismiss this appeal due to the Findings 
of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce supporting the trial 
record of analyzing the income, expenses, needs and equitable concerns, 
including the length of the marriage and Petitioner's contempt of court. 
Secondly, the Appellate's lack of marshaling the evidence warrant 
this matter's summary dismissal pursuant to well-established case law. 
PERTINENT STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 27, 2005, this divorce case went to trial wherein the 
following matters were adjudicated: jurisdiction; personal property; the 
marital home; debts and obligations; the parties' income; the parties' 
expenses; alimony; retirement accounts; life and health insurance benefits; 
four issues of contempt; and attorney's fees, a proposed Decree of 
Divorce in this matter was served by Petitioner's counsel via mail to the 
Respondent's counsel. (See Addendum A-Memorandum Decision). 
Although there is not a sub-paragraph denoted specifically toward 
the actual expenses of the parties, the district court judge calculated the 
12 
actual expenses and subtracted them from the parties' respective incomes, 
and formulated the alimony award as outlined in the sub-section entitled 
"Alimony". (See Addendum A). 
Expenses were thoroughly discussed and was an integral part of 
formulating the alimony award as outlined in the trial record. Each parties' 
Financial Declaration was utilized and admitted into evidence. Mr. Rigby's 
Financial Declaration was discussed and entered on pages 164-169 of the 
Trial Transcript; and Ms. Rigby's was discussed and entered on pages 
176-178 of the Trial Transcript. 
Mr. Rigby admitted that what he filed was his Financial Declaration. 
(Trial Transcript- page 164, par.9). 
Mr. Rigby admitted that his net income from his wages and pension 
amounted to $1,974.33 per month. (Trial Transcript- page 164 paras. 
18-25 and 165, par.4). 
Mr. Rigby admitted that his expenses amounted to $1,172.64 per 
month. (Trial Transcript- page 166, paras. 11-22). 
Evidence was taken showing that Mr. Rigby was supposed to pay 
$763.00 per month for the mortgage, in which he was two months behind. 
(Trial Transcript- page 167, par. 23-25, and page 168 paras. 1-5). 
Ms. Rigby admits her income from wages to be net $1,309.80 per 
month. (Trial Transcript- page 177, paras.5-9). 
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Ms. Rigby admits her expenses to be approximately $1,335.00 per 
month. (Trial Transcript- page 177, paras. 18-20). 
Ms. Rigby admits that her expenses do not include rent which if she 
would leave her mother's home would amount to $650.00 per month in 
further expense. (Trial Transcript- page 177, paras.21-23). 
Ms. Rigby admits that the home is financed in her name alone, which 
prompted the Court to give him 60 days to refinance the home, or to put 
the home up for sale. ( See Addendum B-Affidavit of Loralie Rigby; File 
Jan. 12, 2004) and (Addendum C-Law and Motion Minutes; Jan. 20, 
2004). 
Mr. Rigby admitted that he used marital money for his own purposes. 
(Trial Transcript- pages 170-175). 
SUMMARY AND THE ARGUMENTS 
I. Are the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income, expenses, needs, 
and equitable concerns, such as the length of the marriage and 
contemptuous actions by the Petitioner, to make an award of alimony 
which equalizes the parties' income? 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the purposes of an alimony 
award include enabling the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and 
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preventing the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge. Munns v. 
Munns. P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
Recognizing that each divorce case is different, with many fairness 
issues to weigh, the legislature adopted §30-3-5 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, which grants the trial court wide discretion to the division of 
property, alimony, division of debts, and the custody and maintenance of 
children. 
The Code states in pertinent part: 
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties. 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned 
or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any 
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education 
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. 
Even though the Appellee, Ms. Rigby, was staying with her mother, 
she was married to Mr. Rigby for thirty-three years at the time of the 
divorce trial. The Court heard evidence that Ms. Rigby did not earn enough 
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money to get her own apartment, while Mr. Rigby continued to live in the 
marital home. (Trial Transcript page 177, paras. 10-25). Fortunately, Ms. 
Rigby was able to temporarily live with her mother. 
Careful testimony was given regarding the monthly income, earning 
capacity, and expenses of the parties. It was even hotly contested. In cross 
examination, Mr. Rigby tried to prove that Ms. Rigby's expenses were not 
what she expressed on her Financial Declaration because she did not write 
a check or give cash to her mother in the amount of $200.00 for rent. Ms. 
Rigby explained that $200.00 were her costs in providing services for her 
mother. (Trial Transcript pages 67-70). The trial court had all of this 
information to weigh, and even stated in open court," I understand that, 
that she is saying she does not pay, has not paid $200.00 a month rent. 
And that's - that does differ from what's in the financial disclosure 
statement." (Trial Transcript page 70, paras. 19-22). 
Ms. Rigby clarified her "rental" expenses by stating that she expends 
gasoline, food, and the value of helping her mother get to her medical 
appointments due to her lupus; and that her rental amount was a 
"guesstimate" of the value of her services. (Trial Transcript page 68, paras. 
1-25; and page 90, paras. 8-12). 
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that in determining alimony, a trial 
court must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of 
the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
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sufficient income for him- or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide support. Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). 
The Court held "in considering the above-listed factors, the trial court 
must make adequate factual findings on all material issues unless the facts 
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment." kL at 434. 
1. The trial court carefully considered the financial condition and 
needs of the receiving spouse. Ms. Rigby had no disposable income after 
her expenses were subtracted from her income, and certainly could not 
afford a place to live. Mr. Rigby had approximately $300.00 more in 
disposable income after all of his expenses (including a house payment) 
than did Ms. Rigby, as outlined in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (See Addendum D-page 5 paras. 9-19). 
Although the court did not outline the math calculations in the 
Memorandum Decision or the signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the trial court record reflects that the court came to these figures by 
carefully considering the income and expenses of the parties and their 
disposable income. 
2. The trial court was fully informed of the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce sufficient income for herself. Evidence was presented at 
trial that Ms. Rigby had done the best she could in mitigating her expenses 
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by temporarily living with her mother. 
Further evidence was presented concerning her present employment 
and her trying to obtain better employment. Mr. Rigby questioned Ms. 
Rigby as to her sending out resume's and job applications, and her 
present employment with Working RX. (Trial Transcript pages 75-79; and 
pages 97-99). Through Ms. Rigby's testimony, it seemed clear that she did 
her best to maintain and maximize her employment opportunities. 
3. The trial court carefully weighed the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide support. In the Memorandum Decision and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions, the court calculated that after expenses, Mr. 
Rigby would have $300.00 in disposable dollars. Because Ms. Rigby had a 
need that was greater than one-half of the $300.00 in disposable income, 
the court properly did it's best to equalize the parties' financial situations by 
dividing the extra money almost in half, and awarding Ms. Rigby $125.00 in 
alimony. The record of the trial transcript and the Financial Declarations 
clearly bear this out. 
It is important to remember that the Court of Appeals has further 
stated that so long as these three factors are considered, we will disturb a 
trial court's decision concerning alimony only upon a showing "that such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Haumont at 424. 
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Even if the trial court did not show the calculations in it's 
Memorandum Decision, or in the Findings of Fact; clearly the record before 
the court bears out that there was not a clear abuse of discretion. 
It is also clear that the trial court considered the equitable factors of 
this being a 33 year marriage, and Mr. Rigby being held in contempt on 
numerous charges relating to not providing pertinent economic information, 
when the court exercised it's discretion with respect to the alimony award. 
II. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in holding the Petitioner in 
contempt, and in dividing the equity in the marital property 15% to 
Petitioner and 85% to the Respondent. 
Last month, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "Under Utah law, "in 
order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be 
shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had 
the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so."" In re 
Cannetella, 2006 P.3d 89, (UT Ct. App. March, 2006 ). In each of the 
following contempt issues, Mr. Rigby clearly knew what was required, had 
the ability to comply, and intentionally failed to do so. 
As stated in the Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, of the six 
contempt issues certified for trial, the court heard testimony on four of 
them. They were: 
a. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure 
to provide a detailed written accounting concerning his 401 (k) at Discover, 
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what monies he took out of his account, when he took the monies, and 
what he used them for. 
It was found that at trial (belatedly) Mr. Rigby produced a letter dated 
September, 16, 2004, regarding the value of the 401 (k) account, but could 
not explain what he did with $1000.00 of it nor what the value of it was at 
the time of trial seven months later. The court found that Mr. Rigby had the 
ability to comply with the previous discovery requests, intentionally failed to 
comply, and was deceptive in his responses. 
b. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure 
to provide a detailed written accounting concerning the cash value of his 
Met Life Insurance Policy, how much it was, when he got the money, and 
what he spent it on. 
The court found that Mr. Rigby never provided a written accounting 
as to the cash value of the Met Life policy. Mr. Rigby testified that he 
received $16.00 from the policy, but did not provide proof of his statement 
that it had no cash value. (Trial Transcript page 173, paras. 12-21). The 
court found that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that potion of an 
Order, and intentionally failed to comply. 
c. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his 
failure to provide a detailed written accounting concerning the parties' 
personal property that he has disposed of since the parties' separation. 
The court found that Mr. Rigby never provided the written accounting 
regarding the personal property. Mr. Rigby testified that he sold a marital 
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travel trailer but never provided the written accounting. He stated that he 
told his previous counsel about the sale, and that he only received an 
amount equaling what was owed on it. (Trial Transcript pages 174-175). 
Counsel for Ms. Rigby could not have verified these statements because 
the discovery was not provided before the trial, nor was documentation 
provided at trial. The court found that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply 
with that potion of an Order, and intentionally failed to comply. 
d. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure 
to restore Mrs. Rigby as a covered person on his health insurance, and to 
take steps necessary to make sure that she retained her right to survivor 
benefits associated with his employment with the federal government. 
The court found that Mr. Rigby removed Ms. Rigby from his health 
insurance coverage in January, 2004, against a previous court order. Mr. 
Rigby claimed he couldn't afford it, while at the same time he removed 
$2500.00 on his Wells Fargo credit line so "Ms. Rigby couldn't get it", and 
spent $2000.00 on his grandchild. (Trial Transcript pages 158-161 and 
169-172). Page 161, paras. 1-2 Mr. Rigby admits to not obeying the court 
order to reinstate Ms. Rigby on his insurance policy. The court found that 
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that potion of an Order, and 
intentionally failed to comply. 
Clearly, Mr. Rigby was in contempt of court, and the court had to 
weigh how to recompense Ms. Rigby for his contemptuous behavior. The 
court reasoned that because Mr. Rigby did not have liquid funds available 
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to pay her attorney's fees for his contempt, and that there was under 
$20,000.00 in equity in the marital home after real estate fees are paid, 
that the better sanction was to award Ms. Rigby 85% of the home equity, 
and 15% to Mr. Rigby. There was testimony that Ms. Rigby had an 
attorney's lien for fees upon the marital home in the amount of 
approximately $9,000.00 at the time of trial. (Trial Transcript page 149, par. 
12). 
Mr. Rigby testified that $76,000.00 was owed on the home at the 
time of trial. (Trial Transcript page 129, paras. 15-25). After Realtor fees of 
6% ($6090.00) against the selling price of $101,500.00, (Trial Transcript 
page 27, paras. 1-12), and other fees such as title insurance, doc prep 
fees, taxes, etc. (approx $2000.00) the parties are maybe left with 
$17,410.00. If this is divided in half as the court stated is normally done, 
Ms. Rigby would receive $8,705.00. Minus the attorney fees of $9000.00, 
and when further trial attorney's fees are subtracted, Ms. Rigby would owe 
a large sum of money. If Ms. Rigby obtains 85% of the equity, she would 
likely end up receiving a near equal amount with Mr. Rigby after all 
attorney's fees are paid. 
III. Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence. 
On appeal, the burden is on the appellant to marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and then to show the evidence to be 
legally insufficient to support the findings, even when viewed in the light 
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most favorable to the trial court. Doeile v. Bradley. P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 
1989). 
The court in Doeile found that the Appellant "has not attempted to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
demonstrate that the evidence supporting the findings is legally insufficient. 
His brief presents the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to his 
position and largely ignores the contrary evidence. Therefore, there is no 
reason for us to disturb the trial court's findings. Doeile at 1178-79. 
There is nothing in the Appellate's brief evidencing their marshaling 
the evidence. None of Appellant's paragraphs point to the record on 
appeal, and nothing is stated to support the trial court's findings. 
In Rudman, "With an extensive record and thorough findings before 
us, we are reluctant to set aside the findings absent clear error." Rudman 
v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Ut. Ct App. 1991). 
In the present case, the trial transcript is filled with clear facts and 
evidence supporting the findings. Without marshaling the evidence, the 
Appellant cannot support their arguments and point to areas where the trial 
court has abused it's discretion, and as such, the Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce should stand, and this appeal 
should be denied. 
23 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly the trial court had an abundant record to determine a proper 
alimony amount, to divide the marital home, and to award attorney's fees. 
The trial court also carefully weighed the evidence with respect to holding 
Mr. Rigby in contempt on four separate charges. Finally, because 
Appellate did not marshal the evidence, this appeal should be denied, and 
the on all points the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
The Appellee also respectfully requests that she be granted her 
attorney's fees and costs in this matter given the arguments listed above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /O^day of April, 2006. 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
L Kessler, Attorney for Appellant 
24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / O day of April, 2006, I sent via First 
Class United States Mail two copies of the foregoing Appellee Brief to the 
following: 
David J. Friel, Esq. 
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive 
Suite 225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Kessler 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR (SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON RAY RIGBY, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, : CASE NO- 034903791 
vs. s 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, z 
Respondent. t 
This matter came before the Court for trial on April 27, 2 005. 
The Court having taken the matter under advisement, now finds and 
rules as follows: 
Grounds and Jurisdiction: 
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction of this matter, and 
that both the petitioner and the respondent have established 
grounds for a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, and 
accordingly the Court will grant petitioner and respondent a 
divorce. 
Personal Property: 
The parties1 personal property has been divided since their 
separation, and the Court awards to each the personal property now 
in their possession. Mrs. Rigby has possession of the Oldsmobile 
vehicle and Mr. Rigby has the Chevrolet truck; Mrs. Rigby to pay 
/ AT ^ N 
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the indebtedness on the Oldsmobile and Mr. Rigby to pay the 
indebtedness on the Chevrolet truck. 
Real Property: 
The parties own a home at 6993 Loch Ness Avenue in West Valley 
City, Utah, with a value of approximately $100,000 to $105,000 in 
its present condition. The home is ordered sold immediately. Each 
party is ordered to cooperate fully with the Court's Order to sell 
the real property. If Mr. Rigby refuses to sign the listing 
agreement and/or the sale documents, the clerk of the court is 
directed, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to sign either or both documents. The signature of the clerk shall 
be deemed the signature of Mr. Rigby. The legal description of 
said real property is: 
Lot 32 Glen Heather #1 Subdivision 
There is a mortgage on the home with an outstanding balance of 
$76,405.14 as of March, 2005. After the payment of realtor fees 
and other expenses owed against the home, there should be 
approximately $18,000 to $19,000 that the parties will receive from 
the sale. The Court awards 15 percent of those sale proceeds to 
Mr. Rigby and 85 percent of the sale proceeds to Mrs. Rigby. The 
basis for that percentage division of the sale proceeds is 
explained later in this decision. 
RIGBY V. RIGBY PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Debts and Obligations: 
Mr. Rigby shall pay the following obligations and hold Mrs. 
Rigby harmless therefrom: 
All obligations owed to Cyprus Credit Union, Qwest, NCO 
Financial Services, Inc., Credit Collection Services, 
Coalville/Kamas Health Center, the line of credit with Wells Fargo, 
and any indebtedness he has incurred since the parties separated. 
Mrs. Rigby shall pay the following obligations and hold Mr. 
Rigby harmless therefrom: 
The Wells Fargo Visa account and any indebtedness she has 
incurred since the parties separated. 
Joint Obligations: 
Each party shall pay one-half of the R.C. Willey bill. The 
Court anticipates that the home will be sold immediately and from 
the sale proceeds the mortgage will be paid, and, therefore, makes 
no further Order regarding that indebtedness. 
Income: 
Mr. Rigby has the following income per month: 
$1,180 (gross) Granite School District 
$766 (net) federal pension 
Mrs. Rigby has gross monthly income of $1,670. 
^7 7<^= 
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Alimony; 
At the present time, Mr. Rigby has monthly income that is 
approximately $300 a month more than Mrs. Rigby. Based upon these 
figures, the Court will award alimony to Mrs. Rigby in the amount 
of $125 beginning May, 2005, and continuing until Mrs. Rigby 
remarries, or cohabits, or dies, or for a period of time equal to 
the length of the marriage, whichever first occurs. 
Retirement Accounts: 
Mr. Rigby has federal retirement of $766 per month net. Mrs. 
Rigby should be awarded a monthly survivor annuity to commence upon 
Mr. Rigbyfs death to the maximum extent permitted by law. The 
Court understands that in the event Mr. Rigby remarries, that Mrs. 
Rigby and a future spouse of Mr. Rigby would share the survivor 
annuity as provided by federal law. 
Mrs. Rigby has future retirement benefits from her employment 
with First Security Bank and Wells Fargo Bank. Mrs. Rigby fs 
retirement accounts should belong exclusively to her, because Mr. 
Rigby cashed in his Discover 401 (k) and did not adequately account 
for those funds, even though he had been ordered to do so. 
Life Insurance; 
Either party may designate the beneficiary of his or her life 
insurance policy. 
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Mr, Riabv1s Health Insurance; 
Mr. Rigby has health insurance through his federal retirement. 
Mrs. Rigby may be able to obtain health coverage as a former 
spouse. To the extent federal law permits, Mrs. Rigby is given the 
option of obtaining that health coverage, provided Mrs. Rigby pays 
for the costs of that coverage. 
Contempt: 
The Commissioner certified six issues for contempt against Mr. 
Rigby. The Court heard evidence on the following four issues: 
1. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for 
his failure to provide a detailed written accounting concerning his 
401 (k) at Discover, what monies he took out of it, when he took the 
monies, and what he used them for. 
2. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for 
his failure to provide a written accounting concerning the cash 
value of his Met Life policy, how much it was, when he got the 
money, and what he spent it on. 
3. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for 
his failure to provide a detailed written accounting concerning the 
parties1 personal property that he has disposed of since the 
partiesf separation. 
4. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for 
his failure to restore Mrs. Rigby as a covered person on his health 
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insurance with the federal government, and to take the steps 
necessary to make sure that she retained her right to survivor 
benefits associated with his employment with the federal 
government * 
The Court addresses each contempt issues in the above order: 
1. Mr. Rigby belatedly provided a letter, dated September 
16, 2004, in which he claimed he was "not even sure how much it 
[401(k)] was now," but claimed the value had dropped significantly. 
At trial, Mr. Rigby testified that he received $5,200 from the 
401 (k) . Mr. Rigby could provide no explanation, as to what he had 
done with approximately $1,000 of the $5,200. The Court finds that 
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of the Order, 
has been deceptive in his responses, and intentionally failed to 
comply. 
2. Mr. Rigby never provided a written accounting as to the 
cash value of the Met Life policy. In Court, Mr. Rigby testified 
that he received $16 from Met Life, but provided no documentation. 
The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that 
portion of the Order, but intentionally failed to comply. 
3. Mr. Rigby never provided a written accounting regarding 
the personal property. Mr. Rigby testified at trial that he sold 
a trailer, but provided no documentation of the sale price or who 
purchased it. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to 
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comply with that portion of the Order, but intentionally failed to 
comply. 
4. Mr. Rigby removed Mrs. Rigby from his federal health 
insurance coverage in approximately January, 2004. Mr. Rigby 
claims that he did so because of his financial condition, and by 
doing so it saved him approximately $125 per month. The Court 
notes that the defendant took $2,200 on his credit line with Wells 
Fargo, "so Mrs. Rigby couldn't get it." Mr. Rigby spent 
approximately $2,000 for the benefit of a grandchild during the 
pendency of this proceeding. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had 
the ability to comply with that portion of the Order, but 
intentionally refused to comply. 
The Court finds Mr. Rigby in contempt for failing to comply 
with all four portions of the Order. Mr. Rigby1 s recalcitrance 
caused Mrs. Rigby to incur additional attorney's fees. As a 
sanction for contempt, the Court would ordinarily impose an award 
of attorney's fees against Mr. Rigby. However, the Court believes, 
that because of the financial condition of the parties, that a 
better sanction is to award Mrs. Rigby a greater portion of the 
sale proceeds from the home. But for Mr. Rigbyfs contempt, the 
Court would have awarded the proceeds equally to the parties. For 
the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Mrs. Rigby 85 percent and 
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Mr. Rigby 15 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the home. 
Accordingly, no attorney's fees are awarded. 
Counsel for respondent, Mrs. Rigby, to prepare the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Decree of Divorce. The divorce to be final when 
signed by the Court and entered by the clerk. 
Dated this l~J^ day of May, 2005 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this fj~\ day of 
May, 2005: 
Vernon Ray Rigby 
6993 Loch Ness Avenue 
West Valley City, Utah 84128 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Respondent 
2105 E. Murray-Hoi laday Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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DAVID A. McPHIE (2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-Hoiladay Rd. 
Holladay, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
mm DISTRICT esttW 
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 TOW Judicial District 
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Attorney for Respondent {^^^-^"/p-^—oS^nt^cterfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo- -
VERNON R w P( f ; i r 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, 
Respondent. 
) 
AIM DAVIT Ol 
LORALIE RIGBY 
h:\ No. 034903791 DA 
• a i l suet 
(. OS;.: I ; \ MIIS 
—ooOoo— 
:ss 
. 1 / , : ) 
STATE OF UTAH 
( H \>r r v , v. 
1 COMES NOW Loralie Rigby, and being first duly sworn and upon oath, deposes and 
2 " j . i tes tha i " ' • ' • . 
3 am the Loralie Rigby who is the Respondent in this action. 
4 r am an aciuiu u\ er me age of twenty one, and competent to testify, and 1 have 
5 personal knowledge of the far! contained herein. 
6 3 I proffer that il called io testily, I would state the following. 
I1 in .in. 
Phii-
*rney 
,aw 
1 A My husband and I attended one session oi mediation with Bill Downes on 
2 i • i | nil i i \ 1st, 2003 We had high hopes that we would resolve our disputes there. We reached a 
tentative agreement on some issues, but since then, we have both backed away from that 
4 agreement. 1 lirheve (hat some |MHIIIUIIN nil the mediated agreement an1- salvageahlr Ms liii'ihanil 
however, has utterly refused to do some important things ever since the mediation, and I need the 
« ourt to intervene at this point. 
/ 5. My husband and I have been separated since August 2nd, 2003. I live with my 
n ... ~-i l c r? h e u v e s \n th e home and n te located at WK> I ,uch (Wss Avenue, W est \ uiiey 
Li I in Willi in \\v w a r in to> -i! '• ;!'•*•.' . Mu- mortgage comna?-' 
[ they send me copies of notices because it is financed in my name) that Mr. Rigby is behind in 
II the mortgage pa y •*:•. tti *•*••.• \ iM f . .« . , :ii fh>t pm-* me payments owing on i' 
mortgage for July, August and September 2003. He now says he caught it up by cashing in his 
Discover Lara H- : : . K
 ; . . . i narital asset. 
IT- 6. I believe that the home is worth approximately $114,000.00. We owe about 
15 $80,000.00 against it. This means we have about $34,000 00 in equity. We have been in that 
-•••I.- vin. .* i : need !the Coi II t to en: dei Mi R igby tc • make 1 he • payment so as to pi otect oi ir 
joint equity. 1 le wanted to stay in the home, and wanted me to leave. He has sole possession M * 
I :.( I.:•,!;• a! ' should be makich* the navment. 
7.. For obvio.tis reasons, I also need Mr. Rigby ordered to pay the ongoing obligation 
21 8. The way our mortgage is set up, the payment includes principal, interest and taxes 
1
 '* iierelore, the insurance on the house needs to be paid separate lj " I he ii lsurance 
2 obligation each year is approximately $315.00. I need Mr. Rigby ordered to pay this obligation 
3 as it becomes due, and to pay any arrearages immediately, 
4 Di ii ing the course of our separation, I have asked Mi. K v^hv tor certain items of 
property which he agreed to give me at mediation. He said in his deposition taken December 
6 1 :r.. ~ ;. , u IMC IM - - . n r ^ i ' i n i . ~ ,; 'pertv. t-VH*t^  > ^ >• 
10. \* the time of our mediation, Mi. Ri^/w agreed to give me some items of personal 
property out. * tuc House* as soon as he discovered uua . ., jiued a v.-w issues i esol v eel differently • 
j than we had discussed tentatively in mediation, he began to ask for changes in the mediated 
10 agreement as well. The upshot oi ah \* that he has made *t * cr\ diliicuit to retneve my 
11 P'>SSCNS-IPM^ \ .-hanging til.- -d. • ••
 t. • *u t tSi. .; ' aest that the Court order Mr. Rigbyto 
1 ? immediately give me possession of the following: 
Warrantee stuff in computer room 
1 i Clothes under stairs and craft items 
Paper in computer room 
l o f of Holiday decorations 
r
 of kitchen appliances 
>I in kitchen 
1 L ) Timers in {kitchen 
20 Acmechojpper 
21 :-1 w cooker 
22 Sauce pans, etc. 
2 3 Recipe cards from the recipe box 
24 Deskpad£ 
25 Lid holder 
26 Melmac pjlates in trailer 
27 Afghan hi JanelFs room (red colors) 
28 Books in Storage Shed 
29 Carpet Sweeper 
iv id A. 
cPhie 
3 
^ 7 - 1 
It I I l l i, 
cPhie 
orney 
Law 
1 V • : , * • • . • • • ! 
1 i h Ripbv and 1 previously agreed as he left for California with our trailer, that he 
could have the use oi IL oii^ »;.u. . >. wdhi ^iukc the payment to regime; tne trailer, i paia > i ?•-.. 
4 which he agreed that he would reimburse me for. He has not reimbursed me for it, and I would 
5 like judgment for that amount 
6 12. During the course of our marriage, we acquired Met Life Insurance policies, and I 
7 was the beneficiary of the policies insuring his life. I am now informed that he has either cashed 
-• \ * . ' * * ! ! • . ( , . u r n
 t 
to me as to what, if anything, he has done with those policies, and if he got any money from them 
i : a s f i n i ^ i t : v.. • • • M t i U ' C ' i • • •> ' , ( t i 
proceeds. 
1 ;; K I ^ ' ; *\;io -i i i-'^ ii iai employee dill ini: t*ir> woikmg im \ u \\,i> rcuuial 
i J> Employees Government Life Insurance (FEGLI). I have requested that the Court order Mr. 
Rigby to cooperate with me to make sure that I am covered under his Federal Health Insurance, 
policy is reassigned to Janell and Doug (our children). He admitted in the deposition it is still in 
1- am working and earn $9.1 • hour working 40 hours a week. I am working at a 
- • * w , . *".' >K:^A . nau puio<Jb» oi uiieinpitn ;iien. 
'^i <iko worked for Wells Fargo for eight years full-time as a secretary and unfortunately, lost that 
,wb on AprJ 28th, 2003 I 'hey had a reduction in iorce, ai.w iaid off fifty people in the Salt l.^r 
~p ex.— 
2 15. For purposes of alimony, my income is the $9.00 per hour full-time, or $1,280.00 
3 per month gross. My monthly expenses are outlined on n it.) ' F inancial Declai ation attached here to 
4 as Exhibit A... Mr. Riebv's income, on the other hand, is in two forms. He has a Federal Pension 
5 of $766.22 per month, which I believe is his net pay. He also works part-time for Granite School 
"•" ' -^ .\ %> •• *• ^'~- '-' "*ni ii- W>0„00 per month net "h li Rigby has a total net income of 
v) 1,716,22 per month. 1 believe he has a surplus of funds each month which should be used to 
16. Mr. Rigby's expenses, to the best of my knowledge, are $ 1,250.00 per month, I 
I have a need for alimony, especially .. . :.iovc n.. \ . - lei "s house and i eiit ai i, apai bnent, 
i and I believe that he has some abilitv to assist me. 
° 17. Mr. Rigby identified at his deposition that he is systematically borrowing against, 
j or liquidating the assets we have accumulated over 30 years to pay his debts. I need him 
enjoined from doing so, and to provide an accounting concerning the assets he has already 
18. This is the end of my affidavit. 
DATKI) tins J& , tLiy »i C W ^ . , 
I S . 
f
orney 
1 ' i l A l l ' ' ) 
:Ss. 
. COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
! \A - -r 
4 SUBS<- Kililil) AM < .Vv^ »K.\ . :.-.ic:. ...L I.US> i - ..' "l u- •• J #MU/JLty^ . »i.-4. * £M^..,. 
My Commisskm Expires: C V ^ C J - ^ i C P l 
NOTARWUBLIC, in and(#r 
6 f l ^ t H < ffifl"? Salt Lake County, Utah 
PSS os? ma s w not mas SKS a m m s a w COB AHB flj 
Notary Public 1 
SALLYJ.HUTCHWGS * 
2105 East M urrayHoBaday (tad £ 
Holladay, Utah 84117 | 
My Commission Expired I 
4uiy19,2007 I 
State of Utah ®, 
8 CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
0 T ...oil caused to be haii. l a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
11!> Affidavit u» -bv to the following, tl« ay of yfOj^iAl 
l I 2004: 
I '• • Cory Wall 
I \ WALL & WALL 
I I 4460 South Highland Drive, Suite 200 
1 J Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
\JM£^ 
6 
Sally Htrtbhings 
\WI'(. I.('I 11- N I S\K j c iUYU.ORALIE.AFF 
ADDENDUM C 
3RD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON RAY RIGBY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, 
Respondent 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
C a s e N o : 0 3 4 9 0 3 7 9 1 DA 
C o m m i s s i o n e r : MICHAEL S . EVANS 
D a t e : J a n u a r y 2 0 , 2 0 0 4 
C 1 e r k : c a r o l y n w 
PRESENT 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s A t t o r n e y : CORY R WALL 
P e t i t i o n e r ( s ) : VERNON RAY RIGBY 
A t t o r n e y f o r t h e R e s p o n d e n t : DAVID A. MCPHIE 
R e s p o n d e n t ( s ) : LORALIE KEMP RIGBY 
V i d e o 
Tape Number: 100827 Tape Count: 104057 
HEARING 
Comm. receives and approves the agreement with regard to the 
personal property items being returned to respondent with the 
involvement of counsel. 
In Dispute Recommendations: 
1. With regard to the medical insurance issue: Mr. Rigby is to 
forthwith reinstate respondent on the medical insurance policy. 
2. The parties are mutually restrained from in any way reducing 
the value or disposing of any assets including retirement benefits 
or property. 
3. With regard to the debts: each party is to use their best 
efforts to pay the debts they have been historically paying 
4. Mr. Rigby use his best efforts to commence the application for 
a refinance and Ms. Rigby cooperate to refinance the home. 
5. Mr. Rigby given 60 days from today to accomplish the refinance 
and if he is not successful the home be listed for sale with a 
mutually agreeable realtor and with a mutually agreeable price. 
Page 1 M l 
Case No: 034903791 
Date: Jan 20, 2004 
6. Mr. Rigby is to verify if the refinance is accepted or rejected 
and identify a closing date if it is accepted. The court will not 
order an appraisal at this time. 
7. With regard to the request for an accounting: counsel are to 
comply with Rule 26 regarding disclosures and a scheduling meeting 
and they are to set up the scheduling meeting within 10 days. 
8. The issue of temp, alimony is subject to review after the 60 
days once the home is either listed for sale or it is refinanced. 
The request is denied without prejudice. 
9. Mr. Rigby is to maintain all debts including the mortgage 
payment. 
Mr. McPhie prepare the order 
Page 2 (last) 
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ADDENDUM D 
DAVID A. McPHIE (2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd. 
Holladay, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
¥iim »«<wf«nT mum 
Thirc r ^'strict 
JUN i 200b 
% 
Attorney for Respondent owhty/aerk 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
VERNON RAY RIGBY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 034903791 DA 
Judge Robert W. Adkins 
Comm: Michael S. Evans 
-ooOoo-
1 THIS DIVORCE MATTER came on for trial before the Honorable Judge Robert W. 
2 Adkins in his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Wednesday, 
3 the 27th day of April, 2005 at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. 
4 The Petitioner Vernon Ray Rigby appeared in person pro se without counsel, the Court 
5 having been notified earlier in a Pretrial Conference that Mr. Rigby had discharged his attorney 
6 and desired and intended to represent himself. The Respondent also appeared in person and by 
7 and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie. 
8 The Court heard opening statements. Witnesses were called, examined and cross-
1 
1 examined by both Petitioner and Respondent. Items of physical evidence were marked, offered, 
2 and admitted in evidence. 
3 The Court took the matter under advisement at the end of trial which concluded at 
4 approximately 6:00 o'clock p.m. that day. The Court later published its decision in this matter 
5 via a Memorandum Decision which is 9 pages in length including mailing certificate. A copy of 
6 that Memorandum Decision is attached to these Findings as Exhibit A. 
7 The Court, having considered the matter fully, including the testimony of the parties, the 
8 physical evidence admitted at trial, and the file, and having published its Memorandum Decision, 
9 now publishes the following: 
10 FINDINGS OF FACT 
11 1. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter over both the parties and the subject 
12 matter. 
13 2. The testimony of the parties establishes that both parties have grounds for divorce 
14 based on irreconcilable differences, therefore, both should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
15 the other based on said irreconcilable differences. 
16 3. The parties divided their personal property between them at the time of separation 
17 and prior to trial in a manner that they believe is fair and equitable. The Court should award to 
18 each of them the items of personal property currently in their possession as their sole and 
19 separate property. 
2 
1 4. Specifically, Mrs. Rigby has possession of the Oldsmobile vehicle and Mr. Rigby 
2 has possession of the Chevrolet truck. Each should be awarded the vehicle in their possession as 
3 their sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim of the other, with the requirement 
4 that they assume and pay the debt thereon, if any. The parties should sign the documents 
5 necessary to clear title on these vehicles. 
6 5. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired an interest in a home and 
7 real estate located at 6993 Loch Ness Avenue, West Valley City, Utah. The testimony at the time 
8 of trial was that the offers the parties were receiving for said home which was listed for sale, 
9 were in the $100,000 to $105,000 range in its present condition. The Court finds that the home 
10 should be sold immediately. 
11 6. The parties should be ordered to cooperate fully with the broker with whom the 
12 home is currently listed to sell the real estate property. 
13 7. The Court finds that if Mr. Rigby refuses to sign the Listing Agreement, if a new 
14 Listing Agreement is necessary, and/or sale documents with Judy Pearce, the agent with whom 
15 the home has been listed, the Clerk of the Court should, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of 
16 Civil Procedure, sign said documents for him and in his place. The Court finds that the signature 
17 of the Clerk of the Court should be deemed the signature of Mr. Rigby. 
18 8. The legal description of the real estate is: 
19 Lot 32 Glen Heather #1 Subdivision, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake 
20 County Recorder. 
21 9. The Court finds that with regard to said home and real estate on Loch Ness 
3 
1 Avenue, there is an outstanding balance of $76,405.14 as of March 2005. This balance is higher 
2 than it would otherwise be if Mr. Rigby had kept the payments on said home and real estate 
3 current as he was ordered to do in the temporary order. 
4 10. The Court further finds that after the payment of realtor fees and other expenses 
5 owed against the home, there should be approximately $18,000 to $19,000 of equity that the 
6 parties will receive from the sale, assuming that it sells for the range of figures referred to above. 
7 The Court finds that Mr. Rigby should be awarded fifteen percent (15%) of the sale 
8 proceeds, and that eighty-five percent (85%) of the sale proceeds should be awarded to Mrs. 
9 Rigby. The Court explains its basis for that percentage division of the sale proceeds later in these 
10 Findings. 
11 11. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby should pay the following debts and obligations as 
12 his sole and separate obligations, holding Mrs. Rigby harmless from any liability thereon: 
13 A. The debts and obligations owed to Cyprus Credit Union; 
14 B. Qwest; 
15 C. NCO Financial Services, Inc.; 
16 D. Credit Collection Services; 
17 E. Coalville/Kamas Health Center; 
18 F. The Line of Credit with Wells Fargo; and, 
19 G. Any indebtedness he has incurred since the date of the parties' separation. 
20 12. The Court finds that Mrs. Rigby should pay the following debts and obligations as 
21 her sole and separate obligations, holding Mr. Rigby harmless from any liability thereon: 
4 
1 A. The Wells Fargo Visa Account; and, 
2 B. Any and all indebtedness that she has incurred since the date of the parties' 
3 separation. 
4 13. The Court further finds that each of the parties should pay one half of the R.C. 
5 Willey bill. 
6 14. The Court finds and anticipates that the home will be sold immediately, and the 
7 mortgage thereon will be extinguished from the proceeds of said sale. Therefore, the Court 
8 makes no Finding concerning payment of the debt on the home and real estate. 
9 15. With regard to the income of the parties, the Court finds that Mr. Rigby has the 
10 following income per month: 
11 A. $ 1,180.00 gross from Granite School District; and 
12 B. $766.00 net from a Federal Pension. 
13 16. The Court finds that Mrs. Rigby has gross monthly income of $1,670.00 per 
14 month. 
15 17. The Court finds that at the present time, Mr. Rigby has monthly income that is 
16 approximately $300.00 a month more than Mrs. Rigby. Based on these figures and the 
17 demonstrated need of Mrs. Rigby, and in an attempt to equalize the parties' economic positions, 
18 the Court should award to Mrs. Rigby alimony in the amount of $ 125.00 per month beginning 
19 May of 2005, and continuing thereafter until the occurrence of the first of the following events: 
20 A. Mrs. Rigby remarries; 
21 B. Mrs. Rigby cohabitates as defined in Utah Law; 
5 
1 C. Mrs. Rigby dies; 
2 D. Mr. Rigby dies; 
3 E. A period of time not to exceed the length of the marriage; or 
4 F. Further order of the Court. 
5 18. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby has federal retirement of $766.00 per month net. 
6 Mrs. Rigby should be awarded a monthly survivor annuity to commence upon Mr. Rigby's death, 
7 to the maximum extent permitted by law. Mr. Rigby should be ordered to take the steps 
8 necessary to establish or reestablish Mrs. Rigby as the beneficiary of the survivor annuity, and 
9 provide evidence that said action has been taken and is in place. In the event that Mr. Rigby 
10 remarries, the Court finds that a subsequent spouse may share the survivor annuity as provided 
11 for by federal law. 
12 19. The Court further finds that Mrs. Rigby accumulated retirement benefits from her 
13 employment with First Security Bank and Wells Fargo Bank. These retirement benefits should 
14 be awarded exclusively to her because Mr. Rigby cashed in his Discovery 401(k) and did not 
15 adequately account to the Court for those funds, even though he had been ordered to do so. 
16 20. With regard to life insurance policies, each of the parties should be allowed to 
17 designate as the beneficiary of his or her own life insurance policy, any person that they may 
18 choose. Each of the parties should be awarded the ownership of their own life insurance policies. 
19 21. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby has health insurance for himself and for his wife 
20 or a former spouse through his federal retirement. Mrs. Rigby may be able to obtain health 
21 coverage as a former spouse. To the extent that federal law permits Mrs. Rigby to receive health 
6 
1 insurance, she is given the option of obtaining that health coverage and Mr. Rigby is ordered to 
2 cooperate to accomplish the same with the condition that Mrs. Rigby pay for the cost of that 
3 coverage. 
4 22. At the time of trial, several issues of contempt, i.e. six, were certified for hearing 
5 against Mr. Rigby. TheCourtheardevidenceonfourof those issues. Those issues were: 
6 A. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to 
7 provide a detailed written accounting concerning his 401(k) at Discover, 
8 what monies he took out of the account, when he took the monies, and 
9 what he used them for. 
10 B. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to 
11 provide a written accounting concerning the cash value of his Met Life 
12 Insurance policy, how much it was, when he got the money, and what he 
13 spent it on. 
14 C. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to 
15 provide a detailed written accounting concerning the parties' personal 
16 property that he has disposed of since the parties' separation. 
17 D. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to 
18 restore Mrs. Rigby as a covered person on his health insurance with the 
19 federal government, and to take steps necessary to make sure that she 
20 retained her right to survivor benefits associated with his employment with 
21 the federal government. 
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With regard to said contempt issues, the Court finds that: 
A. With regard to the Discover 401(k), Mr. Rigby belatedly provided a letter 
dated September 16th, 2004 in which he claimed he was "not even sure 
how much it [401(k)] was now", but claimed that the value had dropped 
significantly. At trial, Mr. Rigby testified that he received $5,200.00 from 
the 401 (k). Mr. Rigby could provide no explanation as to what he had 
done with approximately $1,000.00 of the $5,200.00. The Court finds that 
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of the order, has 
been deceptive in his responses, and intentionally failed to comply. 
B. With regard to the Met Life Insurance policy, the Court finds that Mr. 
Rigby never provided a written accounting as to the cash value of the Met 
Life policy. In Court, Mr. Rigby testified that he received $16.00 from 
Met Life, but provided no documentation. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby 
had the ability to comply with that portion of the Order, but intentionally 
failed to comply. 
C. With regard to personal property of the parties, the Court finds that Mr. 
Rigby never provided a written accounting concerning the personal 
property. He testified at trial that he sold a trailer, but provided no 
documentation of the sale price or who purchased it. The Court finds that 
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of the Order, but 
intentionally failed to comply. 
8 
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1 D. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby removed Mrs. Rigby from his federal 
2 health insurance coverage in approximately January of 2004. Mr. Rigby 
3 claims that he did so because of his financial condition, and by doing so, it 
4 saved him approximately $125.00 per month. The Court notes that the 
5 Respondent took $2,200.00 on the credit line with Wells Fargo "so Mrs. 
6 Rigby couldn't get it". Mr. Rigby spent approximately $2,000.00 for the 
7 benefit of his grandchild during the pendency of this proceeding. The 
8 Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of 
9 the Order, but intentionally refused to comply. 
10 24. The Court finds Mr. Rigby in contempt for failure to comply with all four portions 
11 of the Order. Mr. Rigby's recalcitrance caused Mrs. Rigby to incur additional attorney's fees. 
12 25. The Court would ordinarily impose an award of attorney's fees against Mr. Rigby 
13 for his contempt. However, the Court finds that because of the financial condition of the parties, 
14 that a better sanction is to award Mrs. Rigby a greater portion of the sale proceeds from the 
15 home. 
16 26. The Court finds that but for Mr. Rigby's contempt, the Court would have awarded 
17 the proceeds equally to the parties. For these reasons, the Court awards Mrs. Rigby eighty-five 
18 percent (85%) of the sale proceeds and Mr. Rigby fifteen percent (15%) of the sale proceeds of 
19 the home as is stated above. The Court finds that Mrs. Rigby should be awarded no separate 
20 award of attorney's fees. 
-7U 
1 Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
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2 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3 1. The parties and each of them should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
4 other dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between them, the same to become 
5 final upon the signing and entry thereof. 
6 2. The Decree of Divorce should be consistent with and congruent with the Findings 
7 of Fact outlined immediately above. 
8 DATED this /-> day of - ^ j L ^ l ^ v ,2005. 
9 BY THE COURT: 
10 
11 2^/-— f^/vx^^t S> 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to the following, postage prepaid this 2-41^ Day of 
\M0AA , 2005: 
Vernon R. Rigby 
6993 Loch Ness Avenue 
West Valley City, Utah 84128 
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